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Abstract. Critical Infrastructures like power and communication net-
works are highly interdependent on each other for their full functionality.
Many significant research have been pursued to model the interdepen-
dency and failure analysis of these interdependent networks. However
most of these models fail to capture the complex interdependencies that
might actually exist between the infrastructures. The Implicative Inter-
dependency Model that utilizes Boolean Logic to capture complex inter-
dependencies was recently proposed which overcome the limitations of
the existing models. A number of problems were studies based on this
model. In this paper we study the Robustness problem in Interdependent
Power and Communication Network. The robustness is defined with re-
spect to two parameters K ∈ I+ ∪ {0} and ρ ∈ (0, 1]. We utilized the
Implicative Interdependency Model model to capture the complex inter-
dependency between the two networks. The model classifies the inter-
dependency relations into four cases. Computational complexity of the
problem is analyzed for each of these cases. A polynomial time algorithm
is designed for the first case that outputs the optimal solution. All the
other cases are proved to be NP-complete. An in-approximability bound
is provided for the third case. For the general case we formulate an In-
teger Linear Program to get the optimal solution and a polynomial time
heuristic. The applicability of the heuristic is evaluated using power and
communication network data of Maricopa County, Arizona. The exper-
imental results showed that the heuristic almost always produced near
optimal value of parameter K for ρ < 0.42.
Keywords: Implicative Interdependency Model, Interdependent Networks, Ro-
bustness.
1 Introduction
Critical infrastructures (or networks) of a nation are heavily interdependent
on each other for their full functionality. Two such infrastructures that engage
in a heavy symbiotic dependency are the power and communication networks.
For example, consider entities in the power network such as SCADA systems.
The primary function of a SCADA system is to control power generation units
remotely. This operation relies on the entities of the communication network
for receiving control commands. On the other hand communication network
entities are dependent on electric power to function properly. The power and
communication networks are highly vulnerable to nature induced and man made
(terrorist attack) failure. Considering a set of entities in either network failing
initially, further failures may be triggered due to the interdependencies between
them.
For analysis of these infrastructures it is imperative to model their interde-
pendencies. A number of such models have been proposed [4], [7], [14], [12], [15],
[11], [10], [3]. However, most of these models fail to account for the complex inter-
dependencies between the networks [1]. In [13] the authors described the need to
address complex interdependencies as the one in the following example. Consider
an entity ai in power network and entities bj , bk, bl, bm, bn in the communication
network. For the entity ai to be operational (i) entities bj and bk needs to be
operational, or (ii) entities bk and bm needs to be operational, or (iii) entity
bn needs to be operational. The constructed interdependency cannot be repre-
sented by graph based interdependency models as described in [14], [12], [15],
[5], [11], [10], [4], [7]. Graph based models fall short in capturing the disjunctive
and conjunctive dependencies that exists in real world systems. Authors in [13]
proposed an Implicative Interdependency Model that overcome these limitations.
The model uses Boolean Logic to characterize the complex interdependencies.
This model was used to study a number of problems on interdependent critical
systems [13], [6], [9] and [2].
We use the Implicative Interdependency Model (IIM) to study the “Robust-
ness” problem in interdependent power and communication network. An In-
terdependent Network (IDN) is formally denoted as I(A,B,F(A,B)). Here A
and B are set of entities in power and communication network respectively and
function F(A,B) capturing the interdependency between them through the IIM
model (discussed later). “Robustness” of an interdependent system can be for-
mulated with respect to two parameters K ∈ I+∪{0} and ρ ∈ R with 0 < ρ ≤ 1.
An interdependent system is (K, ρ)-robust if a minimum of K + 1 entities need
to fail for failure of at least ρ(|A| + |B|) entities. This robustness value can be
treated as a metric to determine the quality of an IDN when it is set up initially.
In existing systems this value determines the need and importance of introducing
additional measures for improving their robustness.
The interdependencies using the IIM model can be categorized into four cases
(namely case I, II, III and IV). The robustness problem is separately studied for
each individual cases. We show that for case I there exists a polynomial time
solution to the problem whereas all the other cases are NP-complete. Addition-
ally, we provide an in-approximability bound for case III, an optimal solution
using integer linear program for case IV (the general case) and a heuristic for
the same. The heuristic is compared with the optimal solution using power and
communication network data of Maricopa County, Arizona. From the experi-
mental results we infer that almost always our heuristic produces near optimal
solution for ρ < 0.42.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the IIM model is
presented, formal definition of the robustness problem and analysis of its com-
putational complexity are done in Section 3 and 4 respectively, the heuristic and
optimal solution to the problem is provided in Section 5 with the corresponding
experimental results in Section 6, and we conclude the paper is Section 7.
2 The Implicative Interdependency Model
In this section we describe the IIM model [13]. Consider an IDN I(A,B,F(A,B)).
The set A and B consisits of entities {a1, a2, a3} and {b1, b2, b3, b4} respectively.
The function F(A,B) giving the set of dependency equations are represented in
Table 1. We call the dependency equation of each entity as Implicative Depen-
dency Relation (IDR). In the given example, an IDR a1 ← b3+ b1b4 implies that
entity a1 is operational if entity b3 or entity b1 and b4 are operational. In the
IDR each conjunction term e.g. a2a3 is referred to as minterms.
Power Network Comm. Network
a1 ← b2 + b4 b1 ← a1 + a2
a2 ← b1b3 b2 ← a1a2a3
a3 ← b3 + b1b4 b3 ← a1 + a2a3
−− b4 ← a2
Table 1: Sample Implicative Interdependency Relations of an IDN
Initial failure of an entity set in A ∪ B would cause the failure to cascade
until a steady state is reached. The event of an entity failing after the initial
failure is termed as induced failure. The cascade is assumed to occur in time
steps of unit length. Each time step captures the effect of entities killed in all
previous time steps. We demonstrate the cascading failure for the interdependent
network outlined in Table 1 through an example. Consider that the entity a1 fails
at time step t = 0. Table 2 represents the cascade of failure in each subsequent
time steps. In Table 2, for a given entity and time step ′0′ represents the entity
is operational and ′1′ non operational. In this example a steady state is reached
at time step t = 4 when all entities are non operational. The IIM model also
assumes that the dependent entities of all failed entities are killed immediately
at the next time step. For example at time step t = 1 entities a1, b2 and b4 are
non operational. Due to the IDR a1 ← b2 + b4 entity a1 is killed immediately at
time step t = 2.
Entities Time Steps (t)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
a1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
a2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
a3 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
b1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
b2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
b3 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
b4 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 2: Failure cascade propagation when entity {a2} fail at time step t = 0. A
value of 1 denotes entity failure, and 0 otherwise
The main challenge of the IIM model is accurate formulation of the IDRs.
Two possible ways of doing this would be 1) careful analysis of the underly-
ing infrastructures as in [3], 2) Consultation with domain experts. However we
only utilize the IIM model to analyze the Robustness problem and refrain from
addressing the mentioned challenge.
3 Problem Formulation
As described before we define the Robustness in Interdependent Network (RIDN)
problem with respect to an integer K ∈ I+ ∪ {0} and a real valued parameter
ρ ∈ R with 0 < ρ ≤ 1. An IDN I(A,B,F(A,B)) is (K, ρ) robust if a minimum
of K + 1 entities need to fail initially for a final failure of at least ρ(|A| + |B|)
entities. For example, the IDN described in Table 1 is (0,ρ) robust for any value
of ρ ∈ (0, 1]. This is because initial failure of entity a2 causes all the entities to
fail in the steady state. The output of the RIDN problem is the parameter K
for a given IDN and a value of ρ. We formally state the decision version of the
RIDN problem as follows —.
The Robustness in Interdependent Network (RIDN) problem
Instance— An IDN I(A,B,F(A,B)), an integer K ∈ I+ and a real valued
parameter ρ ∈ R with 0 < ρ ≤ 1.
Decision Version— Does there exist a set of entities SI ⊆ A∪B and |SI | ≤ K
which when failed initially causes a final failure of at least ρ(|A|+ |B|) entities.
It is to be noted that a solution to the decision version of RIDN problem would
ensure that the IDN is not (K, ρ) robust. We use this notion in our computa-
tional complexity proofs.
4 Computational Complexity Analysis
The IDRs in the IIM model can be represented in four different forms (1) one
minterm of size one, 2) one minterm of arbitrary size, 3) arbitrary number of
minterms of size one, and 4) arbitrary number of minterms of arbitrary size
(general case). For each of the forms we separately analyze the computational
complexity of the RIDN problem.
4.1 Case I: Problem Instance with One Minterm of Size One
The IDRs in the set F(A,B) have minterms of size 1. With two entities xi and
yj of network A(B) and B(A) respectively the IDR xi ← yj represents this case.
Additionally any entity can appear at most once on the left side of the IDR. We
provide a polynomial time algorithm (Algorithm 1) and prove its optimality (
Theorem 1) that solves the RIDN problem for Case I.
To develop the algorithm we use the notion of Kill Set of an entity xi ∈ A∪B
as in [13]. Kill Set Cxi of an entity xi are the set of entities failed due to initial
failure of xi alone. Using the concept of Kill Set Algorithm 1 is developed.
Algorithm 1: RIDN Algorithm for IDNs with Case I type interdependen-
cies
Data: An interdependent network I(A,B,F(A,B)) and a real valued
parameter ρ ∈ (0, 1].
Result: A set of entities E in I(A,B,F(A,B)).
1 begin
2 For each entity xi ∈ (A ∪B) compute the set of kill sets
C = {Cx1 , Cx2 , ..., Cx|A|+|B|}, where Cxi = KillSet(xi) ;
3 Initialize D = ∅ and E = ∅ ;
4 while |D| < ρ(|A|+ |B|) do
5 Let xj be the entity having highest |Cxj |, in case of a tie choose
arbitrarily ;
6 Add xj to set E ;
7 Update D = D ∪ Cxj ;
8 for (i = 1; i ≤ |A|+ |B|; i++) do
9 Cxi = Cxi\Cxj ;
10 return E ;
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 solves the RIDN problem for Case I optimally in poly-
nomial time.
Proof. Computation of Kill Sets for all A ∪B entities can be done in O((|A| +
|B|)3) [13]. The while loop runs for maximum of |A| + |B| times when ρ = 1
and Kill Set of each entity is only composed of the entity itself. The highest
cardinality Kill Set among all Kill Sets can be found in O(|A|+|B|). The for loop
iterates for |A|+|B| times with computation inside it taking O(|A|+|B|) time per
iteration. Hence, the time complexity of the while loop in total is O((|A|+ |B|)3).
So the overall time complexity of Algorithm 1 is O((|A| + |B|)3).
We claim that Algorithm 1 returns the optimal value of robustness parameter
K = |E| − 1 of an IDN I(A,B,F(A,B)) with set E containing the minimum
number of entities that causes failure of at least ρ(|A|+ |B|) entities. The claim
is proved by contradiction. Let EOPT be the optimal set that causes failure of
at least ρ(|A|+ |B|) entities and xn be an entity in EOPT \E. It is proved in [13]
that in Case I for any two entities xi and xj , Cxi ∩Cxj = ∅ or Cxi ∩Cxj = Cxi or
Cxi ∩Cxj = Cxj where xi 6= xj . At any iteration of the while loop the entity xj
with highest cardinality Kill Set is selected. Inside the for loop all entities having
Cxi ∩Cxj = Cxi and the entity itself would have its Kill Set updated to ∅. Hence
the Kill Set of the entity xn would either be set to ∅ at some iteration of the while
loop or didn’t have the highest cardinality at any iteration. Hence adding xn to
optimal solution would have made no difference or reduce the number of failed
entities. Hence a contradiction. So Algorithm 1 returns the optimal number of
entities that causes failure of at least ρ(|A|+ |B|) entities.
4.2 Case II: Problem Instance with One Minterm of Arbitrary Size
Case II is composed of IDRs having a single minterm of arbitrary size. A minterm
of size p with entities xi and yj belonging to networkA(B) and B(A) respectively
can be represented as xi ←
∏p
j=1 yj. Thus killing any one entity (or more) from
the product term would kill xi. In Theorem 2 we prove that the decision version
of the RIDN problem for Case II is NP complete.
Theorem 2. The decision version of the RIDN problem for Case II is NP-
complete.
Proof. We prove the NP-completeness by giving a transformation from the Hit-
ting Set Problem. An instance of the hitting set problem consists of a set of
elements S and a set S = {S1, S2, S3, .., Sn} where Si ⊆ S, ∀Si ∈ S. The ques-
tion asked in the problem is given an integer M does there exist a set S′ ⊆ S
with |S′| ≤ M such that each subset in S contains at least one element from
S′. From an instance of the hitting set problem we create an instance of the
RIDN problem as follows. For each element xi ∈ S we add an entity bi ∈ B.
Similarly for each subset Si ∈ S we add an entity ai ∈ A. For each subset
Si = {xm, xn, xp} (say) we create an IDR ai ← bmbnbp. The value of K is set
to M and ρ is set to M+|S||S|+|S| . It is to be noted that there wont be any cascading
failure due to absence of dependency relations of B type entities.
Let there exists a solution to the hitting set problem. So each subset Si ∈
S has at least one element from set S′ (with |S′| = M). Hence killing the
corresponding B type entities from the constructed instance would kill all A
type entities. Thus the fraction of entities killed is M+|S||S|+|S| = ρ solving the RIDN
problem.
On the other way round let there exist a solution to the RIDN problem. It
can be shown that the initial failure set would always be chosen from set B to
fail ρ = M+|S||S|+|S| fraction of entities. This is because failure of any A type entity
cannot trigger failure of any other entity. Moreover the total number of entities
in final failure set is M + |S| (as |S| = |A|). Thus the failure set must contain all
A type entities except for M other entities which has to be chosen from set B.
So a solution to RIDN problem consisting of entities B′ ⊆ B would ensure that
for each entity ai ∈ A at least one entity in its IDR is killed initially. So the set
of elements in S′ corresponding to the entities in B′ would solve the hitting set
problem. Hence proved
4.3 Case III: Problem Instance with an Arbitrary Number of
Minterm of Size One
Case III is composed of IDRs having arbitrary number of minterms of size 1.
With entities xi and yq belonging to network A(B) and B(A) respectively this
case can be represented as xi ←
∑p
q=1 yq. The given example has p minterms
each of size 1. Thus to kill xi all entities in its IDR must be killed. In Theorem
3 we prove that the decision version of the RIDN problem for Case III is NP
complete.
Theorem 3. The decision version of the RIDN problem for Case III is NP-
complete.
Proof. We prove that the problem is NP-complete by giving a reduction from
the Densest p-Subhypergraph problem [8], a known NP- complete problem. An
instance of the Densest p-Subhypergraph problem includes a hypergraph G =
(V,E), a parameter p and a parameter M . The problem asks the question
whether there exists a set of vertices |V ′| ⊆ V and |V ′| ≤ p such that the
subgraph induced with this set of vertices has at leastM completely covered hy-
peredges. From an instance of the Densest p-Subhypergraph problem we create
an instance of the RIDN problem as follows. For each vertex vi ∈ V we add an
entity bi ∈ B. Similarly for each hyperedge ej ∈ E we add an entity aj ∈ A. For
each hyperedge ej with ej = {vm, vn, vq} (say) an IDR of form aj ← bm+bn+bq
is created. The value of K is set to p and ρ is set to p+M|V |+|E| . It is to be noted
that there wont be any cascading failure due to absence of dependency relations
of B type entities.
Let there exist a solution to the Densest p-Subhypergraph problem. Then
there exist a set V ′ ⊆ V and |V ′| = p that covers completely at leastM hypedges
in E. Thus killing the B type entities corresponding to the vertices in V ′ would
cause at least M A type entities to fail. Hence the fraction of entities killed is
≥ p+M|V |+|E| = ρ. So the solution of the Densest p-Subhypergraph problem solves
the Robustness problem.
For the created instance of the RIDN problem all entities in set B can only
fail initially. The A type entities can either fail initially or through induced failure
of failing B type entities. Hence initial failure of entities from set B would have
the most impact on final number of entities failed. Let us assume that there
exists one or many solutions to the RIDN problem. Then at least one solution
would have entities only from set B. For this solution the number of entities
killed on initial failure of p B type entities is at least p+M . The additional M
entities killed belongs to set A. So the vertices in V corresponding to the entities
in B would completely cover at least M hyperedges. Thus the solution of RIDN
problem solves the Densest p-Subhypergraph problem. Hence proved.
Theorem 4. The RIDN problem for Case III is hard to approximate within a
factor 1
2log(n)λ
(where n = |A ∪B|) for some λ > 0.
Proof. In [8] it is proved the Densest p-Subhypergraph problem is hard to ap-
proximate within a factor of 1
2log(n)λ
with λ > 0. For IDRs of form Case III it is
shown in Theorem 3 that Densest p-Subhypergraph problem is a special case of
the RIDN problem. Hence proved.
4.4 Case IV (General Case): Problem Instance with an Arbitrary
Number of Minterms of Arbitrary Size
Case IV is composed of IDRs having arbitrary number of minterms of arbitrary
size. With entities xi and yq belonging to network A(B) and B(A) respectively
this case can be represented as xi ←
∑p
j1=1
∏qj1
j2=1
yj2 . The given example has
p minterms each of size qj1 . In Theorem 5 we prove that the decision version of
the RIDN problem for Case IV is NP complete.
Theorem 5. The decision version of the RIDN problem for Case IV is NP-
complete.
Proof. As IDRs in form of Case II and Case III are subsets of the general case
so the RIDN problem for Case IV is NP-complete.
5 Solutions to the RIDN Problem
We propose an optimum solution to the RIDN problem using Integer Linear
Programming (ILP) in 5.1, and a heuristic in section 5.2
5.1 Optimal Solution for the RIDN problem
We formulate an ILP that for a given parameter ρ ∈ (0, 1] and an IDN computes
the minimum number of entities that need to fail initially for a final failure of
ρ(|A|+ |B|) entities. Let K ′ be the solution to the ILP. Then the IDN is (K, ρ)
robust with K = K ′ − 1. The ILP works with two variables xid and yid for each
entity xi ∈ A and yi ∈ B respectively. The parameter d in the variable denotes
the time step. xid =1 (or yid = 1) if at time step d the entity xi (yi) is in a
failed state and 0 otherwise. With these definitions the objective function can
be formulated as follows:
min
m∑
i=1
xi0 +
n∑
j=1
yj0 (1)
In the above objective function m and n denote the size of the networks A and
B respectively. The constraints of the ILP are formally described as follows:
Constraint Set 1: xid ≥ xi(d−1), ∀d, 1 ≤ d ≤ tf and yid ≥ yi(d−1), ∀d, 1 ≤ d ≤ tf ,
where tf denotes the final time step. The constraint satisfies the property that
if the entity xi fails at time step d it should remain to be in the failed state for
all subsequent time steps [13].
Constraint Set 2: A brief overview of the constraint set to model the failure
propagation through cascades is presented here. Consider an IDR of form ai ←
bj + bkbl + bmbnbq. This corresponds to the general case or Case IV as discussed
earlier. The constraints created to capture the failure propagation are described
in the following steps —
Step 1: We introduce new variables to represent minterms of size greater than
one. In this example two new variables c1 and c2 are introduced to represent the
minterms bkbl and bmbnbq respectively. This is equivalent of adding two new IDRs
c1 ← bkbl and c2 ← bmbnbq along with the transformed IDR ai ← bj + c1 + c2.
Step 2: For each IDR corresponding to the c type variables and untransformed
IDRs of form Case II we introduce a linear constraint to capture the failure
propagation. For an IDR c2 ← bmbnbq the constraint is represented as c2d ≤
ym(d−1) + yn(d−1) + yq(d−1), ∀d, 1 ≤ d ≤ tf .
Step 3: Similarly, for each transformed IDR and untransformed IDRs of form
Case III we introduce a linear constraint to capture the failure propagation.
For an IDR ai ← bj + c1 + c2 the constraint is represented as N × xid ≤
yj(d−1) + c1(d−1) + c2(d−1), ∀d, 1 ≤ d ≤ tf . Here N is the number of minterms in
the IDR (in this example N = 3).
Constraint Set 3: We must also ensure that at time step tf at least ρ(|A|+ |B|)
entities fail. This can be captured by introducing the constraint
m∑
i=1
xi(tf ) +
n∑
j=1
yj(tf ) ≥ ρ(|A|+ |B|).
So with the objective in (1) and set of constraints the ILP finds the minimum
number of entities K ′ which when failed initially causes at least ρ(|A| + |B|)
entities to fail at tf .
5.2 Heuristic Solution for the RIDN problem
A heuristic solution for the RIDN problem is provided in this subsection. Along
with the definition of Kill Set, we introduce the notion of Total Minterm Hit Set
of an entity to design the heuristic. Before formal definition of Total Minterm
Hit Set we first define Minterm Hit Set of an entity as follows —
Definition 1. The Minterm Hit Set for an entity xj ∈ A∪B in an interdepen-
dent network I(A,B,F(A,B)) is denoted as MHS(xj). MHS(xj) contains the
set of all minterms that has the entity xj in it.
Definition 2. The Total Minterm Hit Set for an entity xj ∈ A ∪ B is denoted
as TMHS(xj). It is defined as union of Minterm Hit Set of all entities in Cxj
(Kill Set of xj).
Using these definitions a heuristic is formulated in Algorithm 2. For each
iteration of the while loop in the algorithm, the operational entity having highest
cardinality Kill Set is selected. This ensures that at each step the number of
entities failed is maximized. In case of a tie, the entity having highest cardinality
Total Minterm Hit Set among the set of tied entities is selected. This causes the
selection of the entity that has the potential to kill maximum number of entities
in the subsequent steps. Thus, the heuristic greedily minimizes the set of entities
which when killed initially fails at least ρ fraction of total entities in the IDN.
The heuristic overestimates the parameter K while determining the robustness
(K, ρ) of an IDN. The value of the parameter K is equal to |KH |−1 which is the
output of Algorithm 2. Algorithm 2 runs in polynomial time, more specifically
the run time is ρn(n+m)2 (where n = |A|+ |B| and m = Number of minterms
in F(A,B)).
Algorithm 2: RIDN Algorithm for IDNs with Case I type interdependen-
cies
Data: An interdependent network I(A,B,F(A,B)) and a real valued
parameter ρ ∈ (0, 1].
Result: An integer |KH | − 1 where KH is a set of entities that when killed
initially fails at least ρ(|A|+ |B|) entities
1 begin
2 Initialize D = ∅ and KH = ∅ ;
3 while |D| < ρ(|A|+ |B|) do
4 For each entity xi ∈ (A ∪B)\D compute the kill set Cxi ;
5 For each entity xi ∈ (A ∪B)\D compute TMHS(xi);
6 Let xj be the entity having highest |Cxj | ;
7 if There exists multiple entities having highest cardinality Kill Set then
8 Let xp be an entity having highest TMHS(xp) with xp in the set of
entities having highest cardinality Kill Set;
9 If there is a tie choose arbitrarily;
10 Add xp to set KH ;
11 Update D = D ∪ Cxp ;
12 Update F(A,B) by removing all IDRs corresponding to entities in
Cxp and all minterms in TMHS(xp);
13 else
14 Add xj to set KH ;
15 Update D = D ∪ Cxj ;
16 Update F(A,B) by removing all IDRs corresponding to entities in
Cxj and all minterms in TMHS(xj);
17 return |KH | − 1 ;
6 Experimental Results
We performed experimental comparison between the heuristic and the optimal
solution of the RIDN problem. Real world data sets were used for the experi-
ments. The communication network data was obtained from GeoTel (www.geo-
tel.com). The dataset contains 2, 690 cell towers, 7, 100 fiber-lit buildings and
42, 723 fiber links of Maricopa County, Arizona, USA. The power network data
was obtained from Platts (www.platts.com). It contains 70 power plants and 470
transmission lines of the same county. We took four non overlapping regions of
the Maricopa county. It is to be noted that the union of the regions does not
cover the entire space. The entities of the power and communication network for
these four regions were extracted. As per notation, set A and B contain entities
of the power and communication network respectively. The number of entities
in set A and B are 29 and 19 for Region 1, 29 and 20 for Region 2, 29 and 19 for
Region 3, and 33 and 20 for Region 4. The regions were represented by an inter-
dependent network I(A,B,F(A,B)). For these regions F(A,B) was generated
using the IDR construction rule as defined in [13].
Minimum fraction of entities killed(ρ)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
R
ob
us
tn
es
s 
(K
)
0
10
20
30
40
ILP solution
Heuristic
(a) Region 1
Minimum fraction of entities killed(ρ)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
R
ob
us
tn
es
s 
(K
)
0
10
20
30
40
ILP solution
Heuristic
(b) Region 2
Minimum fraction of entities killed(ρ)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
R
ob
us
tn
es
s 
(K
)
0
10
20
30
40
ILP solution
Heuristic
(c) Region 3
Minimum fraction of entities killed(ρ)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
R
ob
us
tn
es
s 
(K
)
0
10
20
30
40
ILP solution
Heuristic
(d) Region 4
Fig. 1: Robustness parameterK returned by the optimal solution and the heuris-
tic by varying parameter ρ for four regions in Maricopa County, Arizona, USA
IBM CPLEX Optimizer 12.5 is used to get the optimal solution using the
ILP. The simulation for the heuristic was done in Python 3. In a given region
the minimum fraction of entities killed (ρ) was varied from 0.02 to 1 in steps of
0.02. For each value of ρ the robustness parameter (K) was obtained from the
optimal solution and the heuristic. Figures 1a to 1d shows the result obtained
from the simulations for Region 1 to 4. It can be seen from the figures that the
heuristic solution performs almost same as the ILP till ρ = 0.42. For values of ρ
higher than 0.42 there results in an overestimation of the robustness parameter
K. The maximum overestimation is 3 for Region 1, 4 for Region 2 and 3 and 5
for Region 4.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we propose the Robustness problem in Multilayer Interdependent
Network. Robustness in an IDN is defined with respect to two parameters K
and ρ. The Implicative Interdependency Model is utilized to model the inter-
dependency. The IIM model segregates the interdependency relations into four
different cases. Analysis of computational complexity of the Robustness problem
is done with respect to these four cases. For the general form of interdependency
relation, the problem is found to be NP-complete. The optimal solution for the
general case is obtained from an ILP. A heuristic is designed that returns an
overestimated K parameter value for a given ρ. Finally we compare the efficacy
of the heuristic with the optimal solution using real data set of Maricopa County,
Arizona. The heuristic produced optimal or near optimal solution for ρ < 0.42.
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